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Article 1

ARTICLES

THE FAILURE
OF THE AMERICAN COPYRIGHT SYSTEM:
PROTECTING THE IDLE RICH
William Patry*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the inception of American copyright law at the end of the
eighteenth century, legislators and scholars have struggled with two
fundamental, related issues. First, what is the purpose of copyright?
Second, to whom should benefits be granted? A number of reasons
exist for this struggle, beginning with the constitutional copyright
clause.' Instead of focusing on a single rationale, the clause provides
at least two rationales, which may, on occasion, conflict. 2 In addition
to the lack of a guiding principle, copyright legislation usually has
been enacted in response to interest group pressures rather than as
the product of a coherent philosophy. Finally, and more recently,
there has been congressional inattention to serious divergences between rhetoric and reality,3 resulting in laws that bear little relationship to the objectives espoused at the time of passage.
Nevertheless, until 1976 copyright proposals were roughly
anchored to the constitutional mooring of protecting authors in or* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University;, Former Counsel, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property & Judicial
Administration, U.S. House of Representatives; Policy Planning Advisor to Register of
Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8: "Congress shall have Power: ... To Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times, to Authors and
Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
2 See infra text accompanying notes 16-34.
3

See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in CopyrightLaw, 94 MicH. L. RFv. 1197

(1996).
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der to promote the progress of science. 4 However inadequately conceived or compromised past legislation may have been, one could at
least find solace in the fact that authors and their immediate family
were usually the beneficiaries.
This is no longer true. Regardless of whether one views copyright
as an instrumental device providing incentives for authors to bring
their works to the marketplace, or as a natural right recognizing the
genius of creativity for its own sake, 5 aspects of our current copyright
statute fail to accomplish either objective. Proposals during the recently concluded 104th Congress to extend the term of copyright an
additional twenty years 6 present us with a striking snapshot of how far
adrift current copyright thinking is from the constitutional objectives.
Instead of protecting authors, these proposals are heavily weighted in
favor of distributors such as publishers. Instead of encouraging living
authors to create new works for the benefit of the public, term extension is being pushed by the estates of long deceased authors.
Horror stories of famous musical compositions from the 1920s
falling into the public domain, thereby impoverishing the trust funds
of composers' grandchildren, were trotted out to great effect at starspangled congressional hearings in 1995. 7 The committees were also
informed that failure to extend the copyright term will result in lost
international royalties, since our copyright nemesis, the European
Union, in previously mandating a term extension for its members, 8
permits Union countries to grant the benefits of the extended term to
non-Union authors solely on the basis of reciprocity. In other words,
no additional royalties will flow across the Atlantic unless the United
States grants Union authors an extra twenty year term. Members of
Congress, eager to reduce the balance of payments trade deficit,9 in4

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

5 See infra text accompanying notes 16-34.
6 H.R. 989, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S.483, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
(Hatch). In the current, 105th Congress, similar bills were introduced by Representative Gallegly, H.R. 604, and Senator Hatch, S.505, 105th Congress, 1st Sess. (1997).
7
H.

See Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation: Hearings on H.R 989,
1248, and H.R 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the

House Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 265 (1995) [hereinafter House Term
Hearings].

8 Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9, 12.
9 See House Term Hearings,supra note 7, at 50 (testimony ofJack Valenti, Motion
Picture Association of America: "I think copyright term extension has a very simple,
but compelling enticement and that is it is very much in the economic interests of the
United States at a time when the words, 'surplus balance of trade,' are seldom heard
in the corridors of Congress, when we are bleeding from trade deficits, and at a time
when our ability to compete in the international marketplace is under assault.").
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crease domestic jobs, and please constituents, were told that term extension is a no-brainer: the royalties resulting from the increased term
will be paid by Europeans to United States authors. 10 And they believed it."
Regrettably, reality is quite different. Contrary to what Congress
was told, United States and not European consumers will pay the
lion's share of royalties generated by term extension, and in the process will be denied access to new, competitively priced editions of
twentieth century classics.' 2 The reality is that those increased payments will rarely go to individual living authors, the only group to
whom the Constitution empowers Congress to grant copyright.
This Article will explore how things have come to this sorry state.
I take a heretical position: United States copyright law has failed of its
essential purpose'-to benefit authors-and is being shaped largely by
powerful distributors and their lobbyists with the dual goals of extending a monopoly (in order to extract high prices from the public)
while simultaneously depriving authors of as much money as possible
(though they push authors forward, puppet-like, as the intended beneficiaries). In creating this system Congress has exceeded its authority
under the Constitution, and unless checked by the courts it is likely to
transmogrify copyright from a vehicle for the promotion of learning
into a form of business protectionism divorced from the creation of
new Works.
We are already far down that path. In this decade, the
"copyright
industries" have sought (usually successfully) to block the public's access to works of authorship disseminated by new technologies, until
10 See House Term Hearings, supra note 7, at 52 ("Congress can, without reaching
into the pockets of any [U.S.] consumer, magnify the revenue curve of copyright owners, which can be delivered back to this country .. ")(testimony of Jack Valenti).
11 Six weeks after the testimony given by motion picture association head Jack
Valenti, quoted supra note 10, Congressman Carlos Moorhead, chairman of the
House copyright subcommittee, made the following statement at the next round of
hearings: "[O]ur own people will be shortchanged ...as far as use in other parts of
the world. To protect those has to be totally a plus for our country and no negatives
whatsoever because, to the extent that it brings in additional revenues, additional taxable income, and so forth, regardless of whether it's small or large . .

. ."

House Term

Hearings,supra note 7, at 232 (emphasis added).
12 An article in the Houston Chronicle on the term extension proposals provides
the following concrete example of how the public benefits when copyright in a work
expires: "In 1993, Willa Cather's My Antonia, which was originally published by'
Houghton Mifflin, moved into the public domain. In 1994, at least seven new editions of the book appeared, from a $2 paperback version from Dover Books to a $24
hardcover from Buccaneer Books." Mary B.W. Tabor, PublishersLose Rights over Classics, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 1, 1995, at 1.
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legislation is enacted permitting them to control the terms and conditions of the access. Beginning with the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992,13 followed by the Digital Performance in Sound Recordings Act
of 1994,14 and more recently in the "information superhighway" proposals I 5 and efforts to encode digital video discs with mandatory copyblocking schemes, copyright legislation is in danger of becoming little
more than a codified set of industry-drafted technical requirements
prohibiting all access except as approved by the corporate rights
holder.
II.

WHY HAVE COPYRIGHT?

Before any copyright legislation is enacted, it would seem essential to determine why copyright protection should be granted in the
first place. Without an understanding of what purpose is to be
achieved, legislators will be unlikely to know who is best able to accomplish the desired goal. Fortunately, Congress's right to grant
copyrights, 16 enumerated in Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution,17 is tied to a specific purpose: to "Promote the Progress of
Science."
An initial question is whether the clause is merely a declaration of
purpose, whether it is a substantive limitation on Congress's power, or
both. The answer appears to be both. The clause clearly restricts Congress's ability to grant copyright; it may do so only "for limited Times."
Any effort to grant a perpetual copyright would violate the clause.
The clause further restricts Congress's power by limiting protection to
authors, as opposed to also including publishers as initial
beneficiaries.
But the clause also clearly states a purpose: "to promote the Progress of Science." The term "Science" should be construed according
to its eighteenth-century usage of "learning,"'18 so that the purpose of
13 Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237.
14 Digital Performance in Sound Recordings Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336.
15 S. 1284 (Hatch), H.R. 2441 (Moorhead), 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); seeJessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR.L. REv. 19 (1996).
16 To be precise, that section does not grant Congress the power to enact legislation granting copyright protection; instead, it empowers Congress to grant authors
the "exclusive Right to their... Writings .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18 This interpretation is borne out in the preamble to the first copyright act,
which reads: "An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of
maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the
times therein mentioned." Act of May 31, 1790, 1st Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124
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copyright is to encourage learning. Unfortunately, this conclusion
doesn't get one too far: besides importantly limiting initial protection
to authors, no guidance is given to legislators on how to encourage
learning. Some assistance, however, may be found in documents surrounding the clause's adoption.
On March 10, 1783, the Continental Congress established a committee of three members to "consider the most proper means of cherishing genius and useful arts through the United States by securing to
the authors or publishers of new books their property in such
works."' 9 On May 2, 1783, the committee (which included James
Madison) issued its report:
The committee ... to whom were referred the sundry papers and

memorials from different persons on the subject of literary property, [are] persuaded that nothing is more properly a man's own
than the fruit of his study, and that the protection and security of
20
literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius.

The rationales for copyright were thus two-fold: (1) a view, perhaps influenced byJohn Locke21 or perhaps derived from continental
theories of natural justice, 22 that authors should be protected because
their creations are the result of their own effort; and (2) an instrumental view according to which copyright is desirable because it will
tend to encourage authors to create works from which the public may
benefit.
Based on the committee's favorable recommendation, the Continental Congress passed an act encouraging all states to pass legislation
(1790); see also Williams &Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670, 683 (Ct. Cl.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)
(equally divided Court). Structurally, the Constitution couples "Science" with "Authors" and "writings," while "useful arts" is coupled with "discoveries" and "inventors."
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884); Alfred Bell & Co.
v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1951).
19 24JouRNAss OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 180 (1783).
20 Id. at 326.
21 SeeJoHN LOCKE,SECOND TR.AaisE OF GovNluNrT § 27 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publishing 1980) (1690); John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property
Based View of the First Amendmen4 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 49, 80-82 (1996); Wendy J.
Gordon, On OwningInformation: IntellectualPropertyand the Restitutionayy Impulse, 78 VA.
L. REv. 149 (1992); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J.

287 (1988).
22 See McGinnis, supranote 21, at 79-85; WendyJ. Gordon, A PropertyRight in SelfExpression: Equality and Individualism in the NaturalLaw ofIntellectualProperty, 102 YALE
L.J. 1533 (1993); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the NaturalLaw: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OIo ST. L.J. 517 (1990).
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protecting authors.2 3 All did except Delaware. These colonial copyright laws, like the committee's report, combine both Lockean or natural justice and instrumental rationales. The New Hampshire
preamble is typical:
As the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization,
and the advancement of human happiness, greatly depend on the
efforts of ingenious persons in the various arts and sciences; as the
principal encouragement such persons can have to make great and
beneficial exertions of this nature, must consist in the legal security
of the fruits of their study and industry to themselves; and as such
security is one of the natural rights of all men, there being no property more peculiarly a man's own than that which is produced by
the labor of his mind.
Therefore, to encourage the publication of literary produc24
tions, honorary and beneficial to the public.
The drafting of the constitutional copyright clause was done by
the Continental Congress's Committee on Detail in April 1787. We
know nothing of the substance of the committee's discussions because
they were conducted in secret, but some indication of the committee's
reasoning may be derived from Madison's famous comment in The
FederalistPapers, No. 43:
The utility of the power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright
of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a
right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with
equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot
separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most
have anticipated the decision
of this point, by laws passed at the
25
instance of Congress.
Madison's reference to copyright being a common law right in
Great Britain is only half right. Presumably his reference was to the
1769 decision of the King's Bench in Millarv. Taylor,2 6 construing the
Statute of Anne as not abrogating common law copyright. Millar,
23 The Continental Congress did not propose a federal copyright act because the
Articles of Confederation did not authorize the exercise of such power. That power
was subsequently granted in Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the Constitution.
24 Act of Nov. 7, 1783, ch. 1, 1783, 4th Sess., N.H. Laws (Vol. 4, at 521) (omitting
capitalized nouns in the original). See discussion in Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two
Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionay France and America, 64

TUL.

L.

REV. 991,

998-1002 (1990).
25 THE FEDERALlsT No. 43, at 270-71 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
26 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769).
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however, had been overruled five years later by the House of Lords in
Donaldson v. Becket.27 Donaldson foreshadowed the conclusion of our
Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters,28 which went further by holding
that there was no federal common law copyright and that all federal
copyright protection "originated, if at all, under the acts of congress." 29 In Great Britain, by contrast, there had, incontestably, been
a common law before the Statute of Anne.
The more significant statements made by Madison, however, are
that "[t]he utility of this power will scarcely be questioned," and that
"l[t] he public good fully coincides... with the claims of individuals."
These two statements, moreover, appear to be related. It is through
the grant of copyright to private individuals that the public good is
achieved. The source of this harmony between public and private interests is not difficult to discern once we strip away our present consumer-oriented perspective: in place of government control or
patronage,3 0 Madison believed that private property in intellectual
work was in pari materiawith society's interest in recognizing genius.
It is not apparent, though, from The Federalistwhether Madison
believed society has an interest in recognizing authors through copyright apart from "the utility of the power" in encouraging the creation
of new works.
The issue is important because while the two rationales (instrumental and natural rights) are frequently complementary, on occasion if viewed as independent objectives they may lead policy-makers
in different directions. A strictly instrumental approach would proba27 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774).
28 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1884).
29

Id. at 663. A contrary decision, based on natural rights, would have meant that

Congress is required to grant copyright protection, although presumably the scope of
that protection would have been discretionary. Certainly there is nothing in the
clause itself that indicates a mandatory nature: Congress is empowered to grant pro-

tection; it is not directed to do so. If the clause had not been included in the Constitution at all, it is unlikely one would view copyright as a "natural" mandatory right:
what is the source of such a right? The "common law" is an unlikely choice since
England did not regard it as applying to the colonies. See Edward C. Walterscheid,

Inherent or Created Rights: Early Vriews on the Intellectual Prperty Clause, 19 HAmIiNE L.
REv. 81 (1995). And, as mentioned in the text, the English courts held that common
copyright was superseded by the Statute of Anne, a decidedly anti-natural rights conclusion. The only other source for common law copyright in the U.S. before the
Constitution would be state common law. There is no evidence of such rights, and
the existence of the colonial copyright statutes is some evidence of the lack of such a
common law. Why enact state statutes pending a new federal statute if common law
existed?
30 Modern day governmental efforts at patronage have been mixed, at best. See
Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REv. 73, 112-19 (1996).
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bly deny copyright protection to works of architecture-the actual,
built three-dimensional structure-because it is highly unlikely that
the carrot of copyright will encourage architects to build.3 ' A natural
rights approach, based on recognizing genius, would grant protection
because the architect's creative efforts are on an equal par with many
other works protected by copyright, and thus the architect is equally
32
entitled to recognition.
Whether a natural rights theory can withstand rigorous analysis
apart from an instrumental purpose fortunately need not be resolved
here, since the grant of an additional period of copyright protection
in preexisting works to entities or individuals who do not create works
of authorship fails under either rationale. 33 Indeed, it is doubtful that
either rationale is satisfied by providing a longer term of protection
even for works not yet created, since it is unlikely that any author will
be induced to create more works under a term of life of the author
plus seventy years than under a term of life of the author plus fifty
years. Still, if a term of life plus fifty years is constitutional, it is not
apparent that an extra twenty years would cross the line of
unconstitutionality.
For works that are already in existence, retroactively providing a
longer term is on shakier ground. If protection is limited to living
authors, one may argue that increased revenues (from a longer royalty
period) may lead to the production of additional future works. For
this class of works, it may not be of concern to the public whether
term extension is granted directly to the author or to a distributor
(according to a contract giving the distributor the right to any future
31

See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in CopyrightLaw, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1197,

1225-26(1996) (criticizing on this ground the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5133).
32 This is how one important architectural interest viewed the matter. SeeArchitecturalDesignProtection:Hearingon H.R 3990 and H.R. 3991 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,

Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the HouseJudiciary Comm., 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1990) (statement of Richard Carney, Chief Executive Officer,
Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation): "We feel that architecture is the mother art.., and
it's only just that architecture should be copyrighted."
33 In the case of distributors, it may be argued that an increase in funds through
extended royalties will permit the distributor to reinvest in the enterprise, possibly
leading to the future distribution of new works. There is no guarantee that such
reinvestment will take place though, and in the case of large enterprises, additional
profits may be invested in a myriad of ways having nothing to do with the distribution
of new works. Finally, it is likely that the decision whether to distribute a future work
will be made on the merits; namely, whether distribution of that particular work will
be profitable. A distributor is unlikely to conclude that it can afford to lose money on
a new work because it is receiving additional royalties from an increased term of copyright from earlier works.
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extensions): in either event, the author will share in the royalties and
presumably be in a better position to create new works. Where the
extended retroactive term is granted to works of deceased authors,
though, it is unclear how such a grant can withstand constitutional
scrutiny: obviously no further works can be induced.

III. WHO SHOULD BE THE BENEFICARIES OF COPYRIGHT?
The answer to the second basic question posed at the beginning
of this Article has been addressed almost entirely in the context of
proposals to extend the term of copyright. The HouseJudiciary Committee accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act observed that "[t ] he debate over how long a copyright should last is as old as the oldest
copyright statute and will doubtless continue as long as there is a copyright law.'' 3 4 The "oldest copyright statute" referred to is the 1710
English Statute of Anne.3 5 Under Anne, new works were granted an
original term of fourteen years measured from the date of first publication, renewable for another fourteen years if the author was alive at
the time of renewal; if not, the copyright went into the public domain
notwithstanding any bequest or inter vivos transfer. If the author did
survive to the renewal period, the statute precluded honoring any assignment of rights for that period made during the original term.3 6
A.

I

The 1790 Act

Our constitutional clause gives Congress the power to grant exclusive rights to authors for a "limited Time," but without explanation
as to those limits. While the First Congress may have been innovative
in some areas, copyright was not one of them. No doubt thrilled to
have in hand a template in the form of the Statute of Anne, our first
copyright act of 179037 followed the Statute of Anne in setting an original term of fourteen years followed by a renewal term of fourteen
years provided the author survived to the twenty-eighth year. There
were, however, a number of departures from the Statute of Anne.
Most importantly, under our 1790 Act, the renewal term could be assigned as a contingent interest during the original term.3 8 This result
34 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 133 (1976).
35 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.).
36 Id. A final proviso: "Provided always, that after the expiration of the said term
of fourteen years, the sole right of printing or disposing of copies shall return to the
authors thereof, if they are then living, for another term of fourteen years."
37 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (enacted in 1st Cong., 2d Sess.).
38 The interest was contingent because the author had to survive until the time
for renewal.
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follows from the statutory language referring to the renewal term being for the benefit of the author and the author's "executors, administrators, and assigns."'m9 As discussed below, 40 this language was
changed in 1831 in order to deprive publishers of the right to obtain
such contingent assignments.
The decision to have two terms of protection, for a set number of
years, with the renewal term conditioned on refiling the title page
with the clerk of the court, set the United States on a course from
which it was not to depart for 186 years, notwithstanding England's
abandonment of that basis of measurement in 1814 and the rest of the
world's rejection of it ab initio. The French, for example, in 1793
adopted a term based on life of the author, and this, rather than our
1790 Act, became the model followed throughout the world. The implications of our choice were profound: authors were dependent on
publishers complying with the (many) required formalities. 4' Additionally, by permitting the publisher to obtain simultaneously an assignment of both the original and the renewal term the value of the
42
renewal term to authors was seriously diminished if not eliminated.
The only value to authors of having such a dual term structure was
that it gave them a second bite at the apple; it permitted authors of
works that have unexpectedly become popular during their first term
to renegotiate their contract for the second term to accurately reflect
the work's market value for the renewal period. 43
By permitting an assignment of the renewal right simultaneous
with an assignment of the original term, the 1790 Act invited publish39 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (enacted in 1st Cong., 2d Sess.).
40 See infra text following note 48.
41 Unpublished works were protected without the need to comply with formalities. The term of protection for such works was not specified, however. See 1 WLLIAM
F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 463 n.16 (1994).
42 The contrary argument is that by restricting authors' ability to sell the renewal
term, the value of the copyright is reduced for publishers and authors. Unable to sell
the renewal term, authors will receive only an estimated value for the original 28 year
term, rather than for the full 56 years possible. See Sterk, supra note 3, at 1219-20.
Economic rhetoric aside, the reality is that publishers generally had the clout to insist
on assignment of both the original and renewal term on terms that did not place any
value on the renewal term. In other words, because publishers could force sale of the
renewal term, they did, and at no extra cost beyond the cost of the original term.
43 See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 14-15 (1909):
It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a
publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the work proves to be a great
success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, your committee felt
that it should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term,
and the law should be framed as is the existing law, so that he could not be
deprived of that right.
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ers to obtain both terms for the price of one, and publishers readily
accepted.
B.

The 1831 Act: Extension of the Term and Restoration of the Renewal
Right in the Authors' Favor

In 1831, the first general revision of the 1790 Act occurred. 44 At
the urging of Noah Webster,45 Congress doubled the original term of
protection.to twenty-eight years. The renewal term remained at fourteen years. The purpose of this extension was "[c]hiefl y to enlarge the
period of copy-right, and thereby to place authors in this country
46
more nearly in equality with authors in other countries."
Also of importance, the 1831 Act ensured that the work did not
fall into the public domain when the author died during the original
term without a surviving spouse or children. This amendment was
tied to two other innovations, also involving the renewal term. The
first limited the renewal right (in the case of authors who died before
the renewal term vested) to the author's surviving spouse and children. This result was accomplished by deleting the reference in the
1790 Act to "executors, administrators or assigns" and inserting in lieu
"widow, child, or children." In reporting the bill to the floor of the
House of Representatives, Congressman William Ellsworth, its chief
sponsor, noted the plight of the author's family under the 1790 Act,
who, "by the very event of the death of the author... stand in more
need of the only means of subsistence ordinarily left to them." The
question, simply put, was "whether the author or the bookseller shall
reap the reward.'147 Of course, in the case of predeceased authors, it
was not the author who would be reaping the reward but his family,
and thus Congressman Ellsworth's remarks might be confusing but
for the second innovation made by the 1831 Act elimination of contingent assignments of the renewal term made simultaneously with an
assignment of the original term. This result seems fairly straightforward from the following comparison of the two acts:
In Whom the Renewal Term May Vest
1790 Act
Author, author's executors,
administrators, or assigns

1831 Act
Author, unless deceased,
then to widow and children

44 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436 (enacted in 21st Cong., 2d Sess.).
45 See WI.IA ELLSWORTH, CoPy-RiGHT MANbAL 21-22 (1862).
46 7 Cong. Deb. App. CXIX-CXX (1830) (remarks of Representative Ellsworth).
47 7 Cong. Deb. App. CXIX (1830).
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By eliminating the author's executor, administrator, and assigns
and replacing them with the author, widow, and children, the 1831
Act limited the renewal term to those individuals only. Congressman
Ellsworth's remarks about the question being simply whether the author or the bookseller should reap the reward reinforces this interpre48
tation, but no court appears to have clearly addressed the issue.
However, thirty-two years later, in his treatise on copyright, Mr. Ellsworth wrote that the renewal term "may be contracted for in purchasing the copy-right, but it is not so, of necessity, nor of course, nor
prima facie."49 While Mr. Ellsworth's views should be given great
weight, since he was the chief sponsor of the 1831 Act as well as its
floor manager in the House, if the statutory language conflicts with
his interpretation (or even his intention) the statute, of course, governs. As we shall see, 50 the 60th Congress, which drafted the 1909
general revision act, was of the opinion that the 1831 Act eliminated
the ability anticipatorily to assign the renewal right; it continued that
understanding in the 1909 Act.
Regardless of how the issue of anticipatory assignments of the renewal term should be resolved, the conflict between authors and publishers over the latter's efforts to gain the rights granted to authors was
strongly felt from the inception of our copyright laws. Congress, in
1831, consistent with the Constitution, resolved the conflict in authors' favor.
C.

The 1909 Act: Extension of Term and Restriction of Assignment of the
Renewal Term

At a joint hearing before the House and Senate Committees on
Patents on December 7, 1909, Samuel L. Clemens, better known as
Mark Twain, testified in favor of the term of protection then being
proposed: life of the author plus fifty years, or forty-two years from
first publication, whichever was longer. 5' In an off-the-record conversation, however, Mr. Clemens informed Chairman Currier that he had
48 Paige v. Banks, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 608 (1871) involved an assignment made in
1828 that vested after the 1831 Act became effective. Pierpont v. Fowle, 19 F. Cas.
652, 659-60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 11,152), involved an assignment that arose
under both the 1790 and 1831 acts.
49 WILLIAM ELLSWORTH, COPY-RIGHT MANuAL 29-30 (1862).
50

See infra text accompanying notes 52-60.

51 Arguments Before the Comms. on Patents on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, 59th Cong.,
1st Sess. 116-21 (1906). Mr. Clemens's first preference was for perpetual copyright.
He also remarked that he liked the 50 years post mortem auctoris"because that benefits
my two daughters, who are not as competent to earn a living as I am, because I have
carefully raised them as young ladies, who don't know anything and can't do any-
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benefitted from the success of Innocents Abroad only because he had
managed to retain the right to the renewal term. Mr. Currier later
cited this comment as support for retaining the durational structure
of the 1831 Act,5 2 and others began attacking abandonment of a renewal term as an attempt by publishers to deprive authors of the right
to renegotiate contracts. 53 But onJanuary 30,1907, Currier's committee favorably reported a bill providing for a life plus thirty year term
conditioned on the author filing, twenty-eight years after first publication, a notice in the Copyright Office indicating a desire for the full
term. Failure to file the notice would result in the work falling into
the public domain at the expiration of the original twenty-eight year
term as under then-current law.
The following year Representative Currier introduced a bill that
retained the existing structure of an original and a renewal term,
although the renewal term was doubled to twenty-eight years 54 in response to testimony that some famous authors had outlived some of
their copyrights. 55 The bill also measured term from the date of publication rather than filing a prepublication copy of the title page with
a government official. These provisions were included in a bill introduced in the next session of Congress; they eventually became part of
the 1909 Act.5 6
The term granted in the 1909 Act was thus fifty-six years: a twentyeight-year original term and a twenty-eight-year renewal term conditioned on the timely filing of a renewal application. In reporting the
1909 revision bill, Representative Currier's committee was straightforward in its reasoning forjettisoning a term based on life of the author:
It was urged before the committee that it would be better to have a
single term without any right of renewal, and a term of life and fifty
years was suggested. Your committee, after full consideration, dething. So I hope Congress will extend them that charity which they failed to get from
me." Id. at 117.

52 Rvision of Copyright Laws:JointHearingsBefore the Comms. on Patents,60th Cong.,
1st Sess. 62 (1907).
53 See Barbara A. Ringer, Renewal of Copyight, in STUDIES ON COPYIGHT 503,
514-16 (Arthur Fisher Memorial ed. 1963).
54 H.R. 22183, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 12, 1908).
55 Examples included Mark Twain, Harriet Beecher Stowe, John Philip Sousa,
Dean Howell, and Dr. Hale. See H. REP. No. 60-2222, at 14 (1909):
The present term of twenty-eight years, with the right of renewal for fourteen years, in many cases is insufficient. The terms, taken together, ought to
be long enough to give the author the exclusive right to his work for such a
period that there would be no probability of its being taken away from him
in his old age, when, perhaps, he needs it most.
56 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1909) (repealed 1978).
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cided that it was distinctly to the advantage of the author to preserve

the renewal period. It not infrequently happens that the author sells
his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum.
If the work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the twentyeight years, your committee felt that it should be the exclusive right
of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should be
framed as is the existing law, so that he could not be deprived of
57
that right.
It is ironic that Mr. Clemens's comment to Representative Currier about Innocents Abroad may have persuaded Congress to retain the
existing structure, in light of his strong testimony in favor of term for
life of the author plus fifty years. At the same time, however, there was
other agitation to retain the two-term structure as in authors' best interests, 58 as well as opposition to a life of the author term from music
publishers, typographers, and piano roll manufacturers, all of whom
59
favored a set term of years.
D.

The 1976 Act and Term of Copyright

Notwithstanding a conclusion that the two term structure of the
1909 Act had "largely failed to accomplish its purpose"-namely to
permit the author or the author's family to renegotiate contracts for
exploitation of the work during the renewal term6 0-in its early efforts
to draft a general revision bill the Copyright Office proposed a two
term structure, albeit with a few changes designed to ameliorate some
of the harsher features of the 1909 Act.6 1 There was strong objection
to the proposal from authors and distributors, all of whom favored a
term of life of the author plus fifty years. 62 Distributors also had another objection, in the Office's proposal that for existing works, the
renewal term be extended twenty years and vest in the author or the
author's heirs unless an assignee was obligated to continue paying roy57 H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 14 (1909); S. REP. No. 60-1108, at 14 (1909).
58 See Barbara A. Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503,
514-16 (Arthur Fisher Memorial ed. 1963).
59 See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPRIGHT ACT, 138 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1978); 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT Acr
39-40, 42, 218-19 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds. 1978); 4 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT AcT 36, 136-37 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman
eds.,

1978); 5 LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYuGHT Aar

412-13 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1978).
60 STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 86TH

100, 127-28, 135, 139,

CONG., REPORT OF THE

REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW

(Comm. Print 1961).
61 See PATRY, supra note 41, at 484-85.
62 Id. at 485.
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63

Motion picture companies vigorously opposed the continuing royalty obligation, 64 and that
was the end of the matter.
The Office's response was to offer two alternatives, a fixed term
of seventy-five years measured from first publication, or life of the author plus fifty years. 65 For existing works, the Office proposed retaining the 1909 Act's dual term structure but extending the renewal term
for an additional nineteen years, for a total of seventy-five years
(twenty-eight plus twenty-eight plus nineteen) .66 Importantly, there
was to be a termination of transfer right for preexisting assignments
67
Comexercisable notwithstanding an agreement not to terminate.
plementing this right, an automatic termination right was to be
granted for transfers of exclusive rights made on or after the date of
enactment, exercisable twenty-five years after the assignment. 68 These
termination proposals were strongly objected to by distributors and
strongly defended by authors, 69 and became, in the words of the
Copyright Office, "the most explosive and difficult issue in the revi-

alties during the entire life of the copyright

sion process. "70
In 1965, a compromise package was worked out among authors,
distributors, the Copyright Office, and Congress. It was ultimately enacted in 1976. The package involved a "work made for hire" section
more advantageous for distributors, and a general term of life of the
author plus fifty years; the contentious termination of transfer provisions were seriously weakened. The weakening occurred not by forcing authors to wait thirty-five years to terminate instead of twenty-five
years (although this was a weakening), but by deleting their automatic
nature. Instead of the copyright vesting automatically in the author or
the author's heirs, the burden was placed on them to file a notice of
intent to terminate the transfer. And the hoops erected for filing the
termination notice are even more complicated than those for filing a
renewal application, the latter hoops having been rightly described by
the Copyright Office as "the source of more confusion and litigation
than any other in the copyright law." 71 Failure to follow the right procedure for termination means that the assignee enjoys the extended
63 REPORT OF THE
64 I& at 103-04.

REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS,

65

REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYGI-rrs,

66
67
68
69
70
71

Id. at 51.
See PATRY, supra note 41, at 486 n.136.
Id. at 486-87 n.137.
Id. at 487 n.142.
Id. at 489 n.156.
See id. at 482 n.111.

supra note 60, at 57-58.
supra note 60, at 50.
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term of protection with no obligation to the author other than what
was agreed to in the original contract, which may have provided for a
one-time lump sum payment.
One objective of the 1976 Copyright Act was to end, as much as
possible, the United States's isolation from international standards as
reflected in the Berne Convention for Literary and Artistic Works.
The switch from a dual term of protection to a basic term of life of the
author plus fifty years was an important part of this objective. Authors
supported the objective not for international reasons but because of
its domestic importance: the tortured renewal requirement had
caused the unintended loss of countless copyrights, 72 while the
Supreme Court's opinion in Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark &
SonsF3 had deprived authors of any benefit of the dual system, a second bite at the apple.
One disadvantage of a unitary term of protection is the likelihood
that a distributor will require an assignment of all rights for the entire
term. To prevent such a result, a right to terminate a transfer notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary was included. 74 Unfortunately, the predictable interest group politics substantially eviscerated
these provisions by not making termination automatic, and by requiring authors to jump through hoops even more formidable than those
renewal presented. Consequently, in practice, the termination right
has become virtually meaningless, much to distributors' delight: approximately 0.72% of transfers have been recorded, as required, with
75
the Copyright Office.

On the balance of author-publisher relations, the 1976 Act was a
significant loss for authors. One explanation for this loss is the
72 Data compiled by the Copyright Office has shown an average renewal rate of
about 15%. See Barbara A. Ringer, Renewal of Gopy7ight, in STUDIES

ON

COPuRMGHT 503,

514-16 (Arthur Fisher Memorial ed. 1963); PATRY, supra note 41, at 482-83 n.112.
Some of the works not renewed were the result of a conscious choice, but authors and
authors' groups have vast experience with unintentional mistakes that resulted in
works going into the public domain. Those who have worked in the Copyright Office,
as I have, can recount from first hand experience inquiries from authors' heirs pleading for any way to recover an unintended loss of the renewal period.
73 318 U.S. 643 (1943). Fred Fisherpermitted anticipatory assignments of the renewal term simultaneous with assignment of the original term.

74 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a) (5) & 304(c) (5) (1978).
75 See William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process:A PersonalPerspective, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 150 (1996). But, just to show that greed knows no
bounds, music publishers, in testifying at the 1995 term extension hearings before the
House and the Senate, argued for elimination of the provisions entirely. See House
Term Hearings,supranote 7, at 74-85 (testimony of Edward P. Murphy, President and
CEO, National Music Publishers' Association).
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changed nature of the political process. While interest groups certainly played a role in shaping the content of the 1909 Act, 76 by the
1960s and 1970s the nature of the political process had evolved so that
any significant interest group could-and did-exercise powerful
negative influence by virtue of procedural devices (especially in the
Senate, with its unanimous consent rules) permitting them to block
bills from even being considered. 77 Faced with a twelve-year legislative
effort, the perceived best bargains were struck. Authors, faced with an
adverse decision from the Supreme Court in the FredFishercase and a
renewal system that threw eighty-five percent of all registered works
into the public domain, were in the unenviable position of desiring
legislative change. Distributors, by contrast, while not fully satisfied
with the status quo, were in the stronger position of being able to live
within the existing regime. Anyone familiar with the legislative process understands that those desiring change face a difficult uphill battie when those whose position will be altered by the change can live
with the status quo. The typical result is either no change or a change
far less than the proponents desire. Authors in the 1976 Act found
themselves in the unenviable position of desiring change, while distributors could live without it. As a result, authors were forced to
make significant concessions, some of which ended up appreciably
worsening their status, particularly the status of authors who work for
78
hire.
Unfortunately, the undesirable bargains in the 1976 Act came
back to haunt authors in the recent term extension bills.
IV.

THE

COPYRIGHT

TERM

EXTENSION

Acr

OF

1995

On February 16, 1995, Representative Carlos Moorhead and nine
others introduced H.R. 989, a proposal to extend the term of copyright by twenty years. On March 2, 1995 Senators Orrin Hatch and
Diane Feinstein introduced a substantially similar bill, S. 483. Hearings on H.R. 989 were held on June I and July 13, 1995. 79 Hearings
76 SeeJessica D. IAtman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L.
REv. 275, 283-88 (1989).

77 See Patry, supra note 75. For example, from 1968 to 1972, cable television
groups were able to kill any consideration of the general revision bill that led to the
1976 Act. Jukebox interests also exercised formidable political muscle, far out of proportion to the money involved. See alsoJessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
LegislativeHistory, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 857 (1987).
78 See Mard Hamilton, Comment, Commissioned Works as Works Madefor Hire Under
the 1976 Copyright Act, Misinterpretationand Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1309

(1987).
79 House Term Hearings, supra note 7. The author testified at these hearings.
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on S. 483 were held September 27, 1995.80 While the Senate Judiciary
Committee marked up the bill on May 23, 1996, and favorably re-

ported it (with dissenting views) on July 10, 1996,81 the House bill
never made it out of committee. It was tied, politically, to initiatives to
reform music licensing of bars, restaurants, and religious broadcast-

ing. That reform was opposed by the music performing societies, ASCAP (American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers) and
BMI (Broadcast Music, Inc.), which are the principal proponents of

term extension. Although there was substantial political support behind the reform effort, the serious threat of revenue loss to ASCAP
and BMI from the proposed reform resulted in a stalemate, blocking
passage of any legislation.

The main rationale given for term extension is the reciprocal nature of the European Union's 1993 directive on term extension: no
United States author can benefit from the additional twenty years in
Europe unless the United States grants Union authors an extra twenty
years. Reciprocity means that United States copyright owners are losing money in Europe, or so we are told.82 Other reasons include the
80 Copyright Term Extension Act of 1996: Hearing on S. 483 Before the SenateJudiciary
Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1996). The author submitted a statement for the record at the invitation of the committee.
81 S. REp. No. 104-315 (1996).
82 See text accompanying notes 8-12. In testimony submitted to Congress, the
United States Trade Representative noted the following industry estimates
that term extension would result in a modest increase in revenues from international sources. [T]he Motion Picture Association estimates of less than
$1 million per year by 2000, and $3 million per year by 2010, rising more
dramatically to $160-200 million by 2020. One of our two major collecting
societies estimates additional international revenues of $14 million per year
if U.S. right holders are in a position to take advantage of a further 20 years
protection in Europe.
House Term Hearings, supra note 7, at 211 (testimony of Deputy [now Acting] U.S.
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky).
When Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks Bruce Lehman asserted that term extension would result in "considerable additional growth in GDP," Representative Hoke remarked: "I don't know how, Mr.
Lehman, you can extrapolate [from USTR's figures] that as having some sort of material effect on our GDP that's over $6 trillion." Id. at 229; see also id. at 230 (further
discussion).
The Motion Picture Association's figures seem highly suspect. In addition to not
being able to project what inflation, exchange rates, and consumer tastes will be decades ahead, the idea that in 2020 the extra revenue from extending the term 20
years will leap from $3 million to $160 million a year is a bit perplexing. In 2019
motion pictures first published (or registered with the Copyright Office) in 1944 will
be saved from public domain status. In the magic year 2020, motion pictures from
1945 will be saved. It may be that motion pictures from 1945 (or a few years later) are
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purported need to harmonize United States law with world standards,
the increased lifespan of authors, increased costs of marketing
works,83 and increased commercial life. Each of these arguments deserves to be examined separately.

A.

Reciprocity

While the reciprocal nature of the European Union directive has
been advanced as a principal reason for extending the copyright term
in the United States, the term extension bills were not narrowly
drafted to recover only royalties United States copyright owners are
"losing" in Europe. Had this been the sole objective, the legislation
would have increased the term only for works whose country of origin
is the European Union.8 4 Instead, the extended term was also to be
more commercially valuable than ones from 1944 (or a few years earlier) but the
extreme jump predicted seems suspect. However one regards these figures, though,
one must recall that they must be reduced by two-thirds because only one-third of
additional European revenues will flow across the Atlantic, that one-third being the
director's share. The lack of any realistic expectation of meaningful foreign royalties
from term extension leads one to speculate about other motives for term extension,
the most obvious of which is the domestic market, in particular the home video market which provides more revenues than theatrical exhibition. Classic movies from the
1930s and 1940s are quite popular in rental stores, but as these movies will go into the
public domain, motion picture companies are unable to charge monopolistic prices.
Thus, following the usually reliable idea that one looks for the largest source of revenue to discern motive, it would appear that the principal motive for term extension
for motion picture companies is to continue high royalties from the home video market in the United States for classic movies. Whether this objective is consistent with the
public interest is quite another question. At the least, the existence of this question
illustrates the misleading nature of the debate on term extension, which is being deliberately cast in international terms in order to mask the much more consequential
domestic impact.
83 See House Term Hearings, supranote 7, at 191-97.
84 There may, however, be a technical reason why term extension was not so limited. Article 7.1 of the European Term Directive, states in relevant part that the "term
of protection granted by the Member States shall expire on the date of expiry of the
protection granted in the country of origin of the work ...." Council Directive 93/
98, art. 7.1, 1993 OJ. (L290), 12. This means that if the United States retained for its
own works a term of life of the author plus 50 years but granted European Union
authors a term of life plus 70, European Union member countries would usually grant
U.S. works a term of life plus 50 since the term for U.S. works will have expired 50
years after the author's death in the U.S. One exception is Germany, with which the
United States has a bilateral treaty obligating each country to accord the other's authors national treatment. Interestingly, under the 1988 English Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act, 85b, U.S. works are also given national treatment, which may result
in a longer term of protection in the U.K. than in the U.S. Such national treatment
under the U.K. is prohibited by the European Union directive because it is not based
on a treaty obligation. SeeJustine Antill and Peter Coles, Copyfight Duration:The Euro-
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granted to works whose country of origin is the United States.8 5 The
reason is obvious: the United States is the largest market in the world
for United States authors.8 6 Of course, United States consumers will
be footing the bill for this increased protection, not European consumers. The specter of a pot of European royalties waiting to be captured painlessly should thus be seen for what it is: a fig leaf disguising
the real prize-an additional twenty years' royalty payments by United
States consumers for use of United States works in the United States.
No cost-benefit analysis of extending term in this fashion has
been made, a failure that led the Register of Copyrights to testify
before Congress that, from a "pure economics analysis," it was difficult
to support term extension because of the lack of supporting economic
data.8 7 At least regarding the retroactive provisions of the bills-those
pean Community Adopts "Three Score Years and Ten", 7 EIPR 379, 380 (July 1996)
(describing how U.S. works will lose this favorable treatment under pending U.K. bills
to implement the EU Directive).
Regardless of such fine points of interpretation of the European directive, it is
doubtful that the proposals in the U.S. to extend term to life plus 70 is motivated
primarily by this admittedly important consideration; instead, it is more likely that the
decision was motivated by a desire to capture royalties within the United States. See
infra note 83.
85 As well as to any other works eligible for protection under 17 U.S.C. §§ 104,
104A (1995 & Supp. I 1996).
86 See testimony of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, House Termr Hearings,
supra note 7, at 201.
87 See written testimony of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the
Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 483, Sept. 20, 1995, available in 1995 WL 557187
(F.D.C.H.) at 71:
One must also factor in what will be the cost of extending the term in the
United States since this is the largest market for U.S. works. Unfortunately,
there are no meaningful statistics to assist in determining the cost of extending the term and the benefits to be gained. Thus, on a pure economics
analysis at this point it would be difficult to support.
Id.
Even though this identical testimony was submitted to the House of Representatives, in her oral testimony before the House, Ms. Peters, after listening to Chairman
Moorhead wrongly state that term extension would result in extra royalties from Europe with no extra cost to U.S. consumers interjected:
Ms. PETERS: Can I just say one thing?
Mr. MOORHEAD: Yes.
Ms. PETERS: I agree, and I support this bill wholeheartedly. There is a
cost, though, in the United States. By adding 20 years in the United States,
then people have to pay in the United States. So although I support it, and
agree that we would be getting additional revenue from the foreign countries of the European Union, there is an impact in the United States itself.
House Term Hearings,supra note 7, at 201.
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extending the term to preexisting works first published as early as
1922 (assuming the bills are enacted in 1997)-it is extremely doubtful whether an economic analysis would reveal any benefit to the public, if public benefit is defined as the creation of new works. The
number of authors whose works were first published in 1922 or shortly
thereafter, who are still alive, and who are still creating new works,
must be very, very small.
A generous assumption is that works first published in 1922 were
created by authors at least in their mid-twenties. This means that such
authors, if alive, are now almost one hundred years old.88 If the purposes of copyright are to acknowledge the efforts of authors and to
encourage them to create new works, extension of term to preexisting
works by deceased authors falls both purposes.8 9 Instead, the only
benefit will be to the estates of predeceased authors and to distributors, who will gain by charging the public monopoly prices for an additional twenty years, though neither the estates nor the distributors
created the works.
Finally, due to deliberate drafting, the extra twenty years will not
appreciably benefit even living authors. The extended term automatically vests in distributors, if, as is frequently the case, the author assigned his or her rights to the distributor and the assignment contains
a clause granting the distributor the right to any future term extensions. 90 Under the bills, if the author is to receive any benefits from
the extended term, he or she must look solely to the contract previously entered into with the distributor-a contract that may have been
written as long ago as 1922, before the widespread use of talking movies, music cassettes, videocassettes, television, cable, and satellite transmissions (to say nothing of computers, compact discs, and the
Internet). Many such ancient contracts give the distributor the exclu88 This assumption errs on the side of advocates of term extension. In a study
undertaken by the Copyright Office in connection with revision of the 1909 Act, data
were compiled on 673 authors of English language books who died between 1930 and
1955, 61 composers of "serious" music, and 191 authors of popular music who died
between 1930 and 1950. These data showed that the average age at medianbetween
the first and last work was 48 years of age and the average age at death was 68 years.
See STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THEJUDICiARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAv 53 (Comm.
Print 1961). Taking 48 years as the median age for a work first published in 1922
results in the author being 123 years old in 1997. This math indicates the reality of
the term extension proposals: they are designed to benefit solely remote heirs, not
authors or the public.
89 Whether Congress can constitutionally extend protection to such works is less
than evident.
90 See House Ter Hearings,supra note 7 (statement of William Patry).
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sive right to exploit the work in "any medium now known or hereafter
developed." Some courts, with Lochnerian solicitude for the sanctity
of contract, 9 1 have upheld these contracts even though neither party
could have foreseen future statutes appreciably increasing the term of
protection, or dramatic technological developments that have fundamentally changed the method of the work's exploitation, and even
though authors receive little or no compensation for exploitation by
these unforeseen technologies. 92 By contrast, in many European
countries, authors cannot assign away rights to exploitation by technologies not in existence at the time of the contract, thereby ensuring
that they will fully benefit from exploitation of their works in new
93
media.
Most outrageously, those authors and performers-and there are
many in the music industry-who received one-time lump-sum payments for assigning their rights will not receive a penny from the extended twenty years of copyright. Every penny will go to corporations
who, in the words of former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer,
"did not bargain for it, did not expect it, and did nothing to deserve
it."'94

A second way in which reality diverges from representation is that
for the most economically significant works9 5-sound recordings and
motion pictures-increasing the term of protection from the current
91 Bourne Co. v. Tower Records, Inc., 976 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1992); Platinum Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 566 F. Supp. 226 (D.NJ. 1983); Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 714 F.2d 117 (1982); Burnett v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 493 N.Y.S.2d 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); see also Barbara D.
Griff, Note, A New Use for an Old License: Who Owns the Right, 17 CLARDozo L. REV. 53
(1995).
92 Fortunately some courts, concerned about a windfall to transferees, have taken
a stricter view, refusing to construe contract as covering technology not expressly
referred to in the contract. See Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1388 (1st Cir. 1993); see
also Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988); Tele-Pac, Inc.
v. Grainger, 570 N.Y.S.2d 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe
Communications Co., No. 91-56248, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 4068 (9th Cir. filed Feb.
17, 1993), on rehearingen bane on different issue, 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
93 See, e.g., Polish Copyright Law of Feb. 4, 1994, art. 41(4).
94 Civil and CriminalEnforcement of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senatejudiciay Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 40
(1985). Ms. Ringer was referring specifically to 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), but the principle
referred to is identical.
95 Although U.S. computer programs are certainly economically significant in Europe, term extension is irrelevant to them. Most software is continuously revised,
qualifying for extended protection as derivative works, and even for the unamended
versions, in the fierce competitive environment of the computer industry, few programs have a commercial lifetime of even a decade.
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seventy-five years to ninety-five years9 6 cannot increase the royalty flow
across the Atlantic (or will increase it ever so slightly). The reason is
simple: the European Union directive mandates a term of protection
97
shorterthan our existing seventy-five years, namely fifty years.
96 To be precise, because such works are almost invariably for hire, the current
term of protection is 75 years from publication or 100 years from creation, whichever
occurs first in the case of works created on or after January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(c) (1994). For motion pictures first published or registered with the Copyright
Office beforeJanuary 1, 1978, the term is 75 years from publication or registration. 17
U.S.C. § 304(b) (1994). Sound recordings, however, were first protected federally on
February 15, 1972, by the Act of October 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
Thus, the first date U.S. sound recordings can be affected by term extension is 2048, a
fact that may explain why the Recording Industry of America has not exactly been
chomping at the bit to get term extension passed. Ironically, it is foreign sound recordings that will benefit the most from term extension since as a result of the GATT
implementing legislation, pre-1972 published foreign sound recordings are protected
federally for the same term of protection as other copyrighted works, such as books.
See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h) (6) (C) (ii) (1994).
97 See European Term Directive,supra note 88, arts. 3.2 (sound recordings), 3.3 (audiovisual works). The term for directors as authors of motion pictures is, though, life
plus 70 years. Id. at 2. In testimony before the House of Representatives, now-Acting
United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky opined that a portion of the
extended royalties would be recoverable in the case of motion pictures in light of the
European treatment of directors as authors. See House Term Hearings,supra note 7, at
210-211. According to Barshefsky, even though directors of U.S. films are not authors due to our unique work-for-hire relationships, Europeans would be willing to
pay one-third royalties to an American director, although not to the producer or to
the motion picture company. Once the one-third royalty payment (the director's
share) is received in the United States, it would be split with the producers and motion picture companies according to an agreement worked out among the Directors
Guild of America, the producers, and the motion picture companies. The expected
amount of such royalties has not been estimated, but for the immediate future it
would be infinitesimal, since the term extension would, if passed in 1996, "save" from
falling into the public domain only motion pictures first published in 1921, six years
before the advent of talking movies. Even projecting ten years in advance, to 2006,
for motion pictures first published between 1921 and 1931 (and renewed), the total
number that are actively exhibited in Europe must be extremely low. And, even for
this tiny number, it must be recalled that only the director's one-third share would,
theoretically, be recoupable. Perhaps for this (or other reasons) the Motion Picture
Association of America has modestly projected additional revenues of less than $1
million (which could be zero) until the year 2000, when the figure jumps to $3
million.
Even if such partial payments are worked out for the motion picture industry,
there is no possibility for such an arrangement for sound recordings, which are not
protected under the Berne Convention and thus do not have an "author." Yet, unlike
motion pictures, older sound recordings (such as historic classical recordings and
jazz) do have an active current market. The proposed term extension bills will not
benefit a single one of these older U.S. recordings since under the European Union
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One could, nevertheless, justify additional payments by United
States consumers under the theory that increased protection will result in the creation of new works, but alas the bills have serious deficiencies in this regard, since the proposed term extension is not
limited either to works created after the date of enactment, or, with
respect to preexisting works, to living authors. It is of course not possible to increase the production of new works by dead authors.
B.

Harmonization

Proponents have also argued that aside from the reciprocal nature of the European Union's term directive, extending the term of
copyright an additional twenty years is desirable in order to harmonize United States law with international standards. 98 This argument
has facial appeal. since other countries are likely to follow the European Union's lead, particularly those who seek to join the Union and
must harmonize their laws beforehand. But the United States existed
with an unharmonized term of protection from 1888 until 1978 without any untoward effects. If harmonization is so important, it is baffling that United States negotiators did not seek (or seek to acquiesce
in) a basic international standard of life plus seventy in the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). If
life plus seventy had been set as the GATT standard, United States
trade negotiators could have come to Congress and argued that term
extension had to be put in the fast-track GATT-implementing legislation. But no such effort was made or even contemplated because the
harmonization argument is entirely post hoc.
Moreover, if harmonization is a genuine objective, there are a
number of deficiencies in United States copyright law that cause far
greater losses in international royalties. Most important is the lack of
a true public performance right for sound recordings. 9 9 ASCAP, BMI,
and music publishers, the forces behind the term extension proposals,
have adamantly opposed harmonization of the public performance
right for sound recordings in the belief that such a right would reduce
their income under the "one pie" theory. This theory holds that
broadcasters (who pay the royalties) have only so much money-one
term directive they receive only 50 years protection, twenty-five years shorter than the
current term in the United States.
98 House Term Hearings,supra note 7, at 196-97.
99 The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-39, 109 Stat. 336 is nothing of the sort. The royalties it can expect to generate
are considerably less than that of term extension. This Act is savaged in WILLIAM
PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRATricE

(Supp. 1996).
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pie-and if sound recording copyright owners are permitted to sit at
the table, ASCAP, BMI, and music publishers will have to share the
pie, something that is definitely out of the question. Harmonization
appears, therefore, to be a highly selective concern.
C. Increased Lifespan
The term of life of the author plus fifty years is derived from Article 7(1) of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, and was adopted by the United States in 1978.100 One
rationale given by the European Council for going to a term of life of
the author plus seventy years is that "the average lifespan in the [European] Community has grown longer, to the point where this term is
no longer sufficient to cover two generations." 10 1 This argument is
internally contradictory. While it is true that a longer lifespan means
that grandchildren of the author will live longer, it also means that the
author will live longer and, therefore, will be able to provide for his or
her grandchildren for an equally longer period.
On balance, then, increased lifespan cannot provide support for
increasing the term of protection. In fact, increasing the term by
twenty years leads to protection for four and perhaps five generations.
To calculate some examples I will use the figure of twenty-five years
for a generation, implicit in the Berne Convention and the European
10 2
Union directive, and a term of life of the author plus seventy years.
For an author who dies at age seventy-five and has children who have
children at twenty-five, protection will be passed on as follows: 1971,
author born; 1996, child born to author; 2021, grandchild born; 2046,
author dies; 2056, great-grandchild born; 2071, author's child dies;
2081, great, great-grandchild born; 2096, author's grandchild dies;
2106, great, great, great-grandchild born; 2116, protection ends. In
100 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1978, as amended). It is intended to provide protection for the author and the first two generations of his descendants.
101 See Council Directive 93/98, Preamble at (5), 1993 O.J. (L290), 9 (harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights).
102 One could argue that in some countries, mostly those in the industrialized
West, couples are having children at a later date and thus the 25 year figure should be
altered. Using life plus 70 and two generations, the base line figure would thus be 35,
not 25 years, significantly altering the analysis in the text. The European Union has
not, however, suggested this is a reason for its decision to extend term. Indeed, the
principal reason behind the increased term was a desire to "harmonize up" rather
than "down." A number of Union members, such as France and Germany had terms
longer than life plus 50. The Union chose to increase the term to harmonize up to
these longer terms, rather than require France and Germany to shorten their term to
conform to the dominant term of life plus 50.
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2116, the author's child will have been dead for forty-five years; the
author's grandchild will have been dead for twenty years; the greatgrandchild will be sixty years old; the great, great-grandchild will be
thirty-five years old, and the great, great, great-grandchild will be ten
years old.
Extension of protection to such remote heirs is impossible tojustify in terms of encouraging the author to create, or any reasonable
societal interest in the author's immediate heirs.
D. Increased Costs of Protection and Extended Commercial Life
The argument that the term of copyright needs to be increased
twenty years because of increased costs of creation for works such as
sheet music 1 03 and motion pictures is without economic foundation.
Not a single example has been given of a work that failed to make a
profit in its first seventy-five years, or during the life of the author plus
fifty years, but which would make a profit if term was extended an
additional twenty years.
However, the argument that works of authorship have an increased commercial life is undoubtedly correct. With new media and
a proliferation of cable television channels, older works are now more
widely available. But the fact that money can be made for a longer
period of time is not a sufficient reason for term extension. Under
the Constitution, copyright must be for a limited time. It has to end
regardless of whether the work still has commercial value. The music
of Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven, the paintings of Rembrandt and
countless others, are highly popular. Should they still be under copyright because they still have commercial value?
At some point, a long term of protection loses all connection to
acknowledging the author for his or her creativity, to providing incentives for the author to create, or to looking after the author's immediate family. A term of two hundred years is outside of reason. A term
of life of the author plus seventy years is also unlikely to inspire the
creation of a single work that a term of life plus fifty would not also
have inspired.
V.

CONCLUSION: THE REAL IMPETUS

The real impetus for term extension comes from a very small
group: children and grandchildren of famous composers whose works
are beginning to fall into the public domain, thereby threatening trust
funds. These estates have considerable political and financial impact
103

See House Term Hearings,supra note 7, at 82-84.
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with ASCAP, the music performing rights collecting society. It is ASCAP and the other collecting society, BMI (in its traditional me-too
role) who are pushing term extension, although their advocacy led to
term extension being killed in the 104th Congress by those seeking to
reform ASCAP and BMI's licensing practices for restaurants and bars.
The estates of these famous composers frequently are music publishers as well, completing the royalty loop and eliminating any concerns
about termination of transfers.
Individual songwriters and other authors have been left in the
lurch, in a sad reminder that those who have forget those who have
not. Instead of vesting the additional twenty years in the author, the
twenty years is vested in the assignee, the music publisher. The result
is that publishers and distributors have now become the initial beneficiaries of copyright. This violates the Constitution, which vests power
in Congress to grant copyright solely to authors and solely in order to
promote the progress of science. Granting rights to distributors and
the estates of deceased authors cannot fulfill the constitutional imperative and is, therefore, outside of Congress's authority. It is time for
the courts to set things right.

